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These Briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task Force 
on the Intergovernmental Conference. Their purpose is to gather together, 
in an organized, summary form, the proposals and suggestions which the 
authorities in the Member States, the Union's institutions and specialist 
commentators have put forward on the issues likely to be on the IGC/96 
agenda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
The Court of Justice 
2 The Commission 
3 The Court of Auditors, ESC and COR 
4 Differentiated integration. 
5 The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
6 The role of the national parliaments 
7 The hierarchy of Community acts 
8 The co-decision procedure 
9 Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs 
10 European citizenship 
11 WEU, security and defence 
12 The public services 
13 Social policy 
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THE COMMISSION Second update (24 July 1995) 
SUMMARY 
The number of Members of the Commission is likely to be fiercely debated. The 
result may be a decision endorsing the principle of one Commissioner per Member 
State. 
The Commission's monopoly of initiative and the extent of its executive powers 
may also be challenged. 
A Council right of censure on the Commission is a reform that is unlikely to 
come off, as it would cause a significant change in the institutional balance 
of forces. 
CONFERENCE AGENDA 
A review of the Treaty provisions on the Commission is not on the Conference 
agenda laid down by the Treaty itself. 
However, the Brussels European Council in December 1993 announced that the 
Conference would consider 'the questions relating to the number of Members of 
the Commission' and, more generally, 'any measures deemed necessary to 
facilitate the work of the institutions and guarantee their effective 
operation'. 
SOURCES 
A number of the Member States' governments, e.g. Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Austria, have taken an official position or precise decision on 
these questions. The reports by the Commission itself and the Council on the 
operation of the TEU are silent on the matter; only Parliament's resolution of 
17 May 1995 (based on the Bourlanges/Martin report) clearly states its position. 
Reference is made to some informal or unofficial government positions, and the 
views of some commentators. 
Finally, attention is drawn to Parliament's proposals in the draft Treaty on the 
European Union (Spinelli report, February 1984) and the draft Constitution of 
the European Union (Herman report, February 1994). 
POSITIONS 
1 . NUMBER OF MEMBERS 
Virtually all the views stated are in favour of amending the present rule (two 
Commissioners per l~rge country and one pe~,medium-sized.or small country) so 
as to avoid having too many Commissioners in a larger Union. 
However, most of the medium-sized or small countries want to keep one 
Commissioner per Member State (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Denmark 
and Austria) on the grounds that account might not otherwise be taken of the 
interests of all the states and that this would cause Member States to lose 
confidence in the process of integration. The European Parliament has adopted 
the same position (Resolution of 17 May 1995). The present Commission President 
has publicly and repeatedly supported this view. 
The large countries generally say they are keen on reducing the size of the 
Commission (Germany) but several of them have stressed that it would be 
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impossible to consider having fewer Commissioners that the number of Member 
States (Italy) . The idea of having one instead of two Members per state is 
envisaged by Belgium, France and Italy. 
The possibility of having fewer Commissioners than Member States (which would 
mean appointing one permanent Commissioner for each large state and allocating 
the others to the small and medium-sized states on a rota basis) is mentioned 
by a number of states, all of which acknowledge that this reduction will, in 
practice, require the Commission to adopt new operating methods: appointment of 
Deputy Commissioners (Belgium and Spain), reorganization of its internal 
structure (Ireland and the European Parliament) and/or presidentialization of 
the Commission (European Parliament). 
The Reflection Group also felt that it might be advisable to set a maximum 
number of Members so as to guarantee that the Commission remains consistent, 
efficient and transparent, and wonder whether the future Union should retain the 
'at least one Commissioner per Member State' rule and introduce various 
categories of Commissioners. 
Some unofficial sources advocate a smaller number of Commissioners, to reflect 
the number of Commission tasks or departments, i.e. about 15 Members 
(Bertelsman, European Movement, Juste Lipse etc). 
2. METHOD OF APPOINTING THE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS 
At the moment no Member State seems to have proposed changing the present system 
(nomination of the President by the governments after consulting Parliament; 
nomination of the Members after consulting the President; approval of the 
college by Parliament; appointment by the governments). 
Parliament (in its resolution of 17 May 1995) wants: 
1 . the President to be elected by Parliament from a list proposed by the 
European Council; 
2. the Members to be appointed by agreement between the President and the 
governments of the Member States; 
3. the college to be invested by Parliament. 
In its previous proposals Parliament advocated 
* 
* 
* 
election of the President by the European Council (Spinelli report) or 
Parliament on a proposal by the European Council (Herman report); 
choice of Members by the President in consultation (Spinelli report) or by 
agreement (Herman report) with the Council; 
vote of investiture by Parliament. 
Opinion also generally favours strengthening Parliament's role in appointing the 
President and the President's role in appointing Members. For instance, there 
are proposals: 
* 
* 
for the Presi<:l.ent to ·Be appointed· by ·Parliament with the assent of the 
Council and for the Members to be nominated by the President and confirmed 
by Parliament and the Council (Bertelsman) ; 
for the President to be appointed by Parliament on a proposal from the 
European Council, for the Members to be appointed by the President in 
consultation with Parliament and the governments and for the college as a 
whole to be confirmed by the Council (by a majority) and Parliament (European 
Movement). · 
In the same way, some sources are said to favour strengthening the President's 
role (Italian Government), or a more presidential style (European Parliament), 
in running the Commission. 
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The Reflection Group wonders whether it might be advisable to review the 
criteria for appointing Commissioners and give the President a more important 
role. 
3. THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSIBILITIES 
Most sources seem to want control over the Commission to be tightened up, 
without saying precisely how. 
The issue of a possible Council right of censure on the Commission (i.e. by 
either the Council of the European Union or the European Council) is being aired 
by the Spanish Government and some commentators (e.g. the European Movement); 
the French Government seems fairly keen on the idea, as does the previous 
Commission President. The European Parliament is claiming the right to call for 
automatic resignation of a Commissioner under Articles 157 and 160 of the Treaty 
on European Union. 
4. THE COMMISSION'S POWERS OF INITIATIVE AND EXECUTION 
The Commission's right of initiative must be preserved (European Parliament, 
Ireland and Italy) , if not reinforced (Sweden and Juste Lipse) . 
However, the Spanish Government thinks it would be worth raising the issue of 
power-sharing at the IGC; some governmental sources (e.g. France and Denmark) 
accept or favour the idea. Certain commentators are proposing that the right of 
initiative should be exercised by the Commission, Council and Parliament on an 
equal basis (e.g. K. Lammers and the Philip Morris Institute). 
The Commission's executive or management powers were to be exclusive in 
Parliament's original design (Spinelli and Herman reports); a right of veto by 
the Council and Parliament is now proposed (European Parliament); better control 
by Parliament of the Commission's day-to-day management is also suggested 
(Spanish Government) . The Luxembourg Government is calling for the Commission 
to be given new executive powers. 
The Austrian Government advocates that the Commission be given power to act 
against fraud and in the field of justice and home affairs ('third pillar'). 
Germany also considers that the Commission should, jointly with the Member 
States, have a right of initiative in this field and in respect of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy ('second pillar'). 
[Other aspects of the Commission's powers and responsibilities will be dealt 
with in 'vertical' briefings on the decision-making process, the second and 
third pillars, the hierarchy of Community acts, etc.] 
* * * * * 
[For further information on this note please contact Mr Giraud, Lux. 2556.] 
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